An article by Alain Alameddine and Seth Morrison on the Middle East Monitor, also in Hebrew on the One Democratic State Initiative's website

Seventy-six years of occupation, ethnic cleansing and settler-colonization, leading up to today's genocide in Gaza, cannot disappear overnight. In light of this, does the historical Palestinian and antizionist Jewish vision for a single democratic state where Palestinians and previous Israelis coexist make any sense? How would such a state guarantee the security of its citizens—Wouldn't previous oppressors and victims be at each others' throats?

Zionism claims that Jews have always been and will always be persecuted. Accordingly it presents a model for a state exclusive to Jews as the only solution, and promotes this apartheid throughout the world, by taking advantage of the long history of European antisemitism to encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine to leave their societies, cleansing non-Jews from Palestine using different means of violence, and even supporting similar identitarian projects in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria and other countries. In other words, Zionism claims that violence is inherent to having different identities and that separation is the only solution. The Palestinian liberation movement on the other hand has historically declared that violence in the region is the outcome of an oppressive settler colonial project, and that dismantling it is the solution.

Who is right? Could a democratic state guarantee peace and security for all of its citizens? And what do historical cases of colonization and decolonization have to teach us?

Dismantling colonial relations of power, establishing the legitimacy of the democratic state

In Ghassan Kanafani's "Returning to Haifa", the Palestinian child raised by Israeli settlers ended up joining the occupation forces. One could also easily imagine a settlers' son raised by Palestinians joining the resistance. This shows that violence, both the occupiers' and the occupied's, is the result of a political structure rather than of any inherent qualities. The fact that over 90% of Jewish Israelis side with the genocide in Gaza and that most Palestinians side with armed resistance is the result of colonial relations of power that were imposed by a colonial state. In other words, the role of the decolonial democratic state is not to "inherit" a cohesive society but to build and develop cohesion within it. In the word of Fanon, "decolonization brings a natural rhythm into existence … Decolonization is the veritable creation of new men". This required understanding how the settler state has imposed colonial relations of power and then determining what policies will dismantle them. The democratic state is a democratizing state.

For example, the state will grant Palestinians the rights that the Zionist state had deprived them, particularly the right of return and the right to compensation, without being unjust to Jews. It will implement a model that would be fair to all, regardless of their socioeconomic status. It will abrogate racist laws such as the Basic Law or Citizenship Law, ensuring that all are totally equal before the Law, and will criminalize political Zionism and all kinds of settler colonial ideologies. Instead of having different school curricula for Jews and non-Jews, it will unify the curriculum; and will make sure that universal civic values replace Zionist values in it. At the socio economic level, it will establish a comprehensive safety net with universal free education, universal health care and full equality in hiring and wages, closing today's income, poverty and education gaps. Previous war crimes will also have to be investigated, although the mechanisms will need to be determined by the future citizens of that state—both Palestinians and their Israeli partners.

The state will also have the monopoly of violence, which includes disarming segments of the population that are currently armed. And to quote Ner Kitri in his article "The transition from a Jewish state to true democracy will benefit all", it will use this monopoly to "protect its citizens’ lives rather than colonial privileges". Finally, the state will commit not to use its armed forces for expansionist purposes as Israel historically has. As in the cases of Kenya, South Africa and Algeria which we will discuss in more details below, deportation will not be on the table. Israelis who feel a genuine connection to the land (be it for religious, cultural or other reasons) will enjoy life as equals in a dezionized Palestine, while those who choose to leave will be able to do so peacefully.

By eliminating colonial privileges while guaranteeing rights to all, the new Palestinian state will establish and solidify its legitimacy in the eyes of its society. Crucially, instead of legitimizing its existence on the basis of representing sectarian interests, it will do so on the basis of its functional capacity to administer the affairs of its society and to guarantee its citizens' rights—rights that Israel denies Palestinians and failed to deliver to Jews. This change—this decolonization, in the fullest sense of the word—will signal a rupture with Zionism and the global colonial project. The result will be a society where tribal identities will melt away and whose citizens will not merely "coexist" but actually live together, the two previous demographic groups forming a single "mosaic of life" as Ilan Pappe expressed it.

This said—is this a realistic vision of what could happen? What does the history of Palestine, as well as historical cases of decolonization, have to teach us?

Violence under colonization and after it: Historical examples

Palestine has always been the home of Christians, Muslims, Jews, Bahai and observers of many different religions who lived together in peace. Before colonial Zionists, Palestine welcomed non-Palestinians such as Kurds, Armenians, Circassians and European Jews. For example, Zionist education initiative "TBTN" indicates that there was an "important and vital Jewish community in Gaza during the early Muslim period", and that "the Jewish community experienced a period of prosperity under Ottoman rule". TBTN explains this peace was disturbed on two occasions: First in 1799, when Jews fled Gaza ahead of Napoleon's invasion of Palestine, "marking the temporary end of a Jewish presence in the area." These Gazans returned in the 19th century and "the city was again an important Jewish center". This ended in the 1920s when, following the mass migration of Jews to Palestine and Balfour's promise to establish "a national home for Jews in Palestine", riots started throughout Palestine and Gazan Jews fled once again. In both cases, violence was the result of European colonial interference, not of inherent religious or cultural differences. As expressed in the Palestinian letter "To Our Other", "it is Zionism that has stood in the way of life, common life, on the basis of freedom and fairness".

Some recognize the above and understand that Jews and Palestinians can coexist in a dezionized land, but fear that in this specific case—over 76 years of oppression—it will prove impossible for previous oppressors and victims to live together. Obviously, feelings of supremacy on one hand and of revenge on the other are to be expected. Interestingly, historical cases of decolonization seem to reveal a pattern: When the balance of forces tips in favor of the indigenous, a transition that is more or less rough happens, a large number of settlers leave, those willing to let go of colonial privileges remain in peace. In other words, history shows that although the process of liberation can be violent, the liberation actually ends, not increases, violence between previous enemies.

Kenya is one such example. The Mau Mau uprising, which began in the early 1950s, was a significant and violent resistance movement against British colonial rule. After years of unrest and increasing pressure, the British government was forced to negotiate the independence of Kenya with the native liberation movement. The new state promoted a policy of forgiveness and reassured settlers that they could stay and contribute as equals. Many settlers left, fearing reprisals. Those who stayed did have to relinquish privileges, particularly in terms of land and resource redistribution, but there were zero cases of large-scale revenge.

The Évian accords that ended the French colonization of Algeria stated that Europeans could depart, remain as foreigners, or take Algerian citizenship. In his article "The liberation of Palestine and the fate of the Israelis", Eitan Bronstein Aparicio explains that following the announcement "a violent terrorist organization named OAS (Organisation Armée Secrète or “Secret Army Organization”) emerged and caused many casualties, mainly Algerians but also anti-colonial French, in an attempt to prevent the liberation of Algeria". This violence subsided within two months. After which, Eitan continues, "Most [settlers] chose to leave Algeria. They ran away in panic, out of fear of the day their domination would be over. But in fact, there was no real existential threat to them. They left because they were captive in their own colonial identity. In other words, they could not imagine a situation in which they would live in equality with the Algerians. And they paid a huge price for being uprooted from their home due to their own occupier mentality … [While] 200,000 French decided to stay and live in the liberated Algeria. From their testimonies, we learn that they saw Algeria as their home, and they had no reason to leave."

The end of apartheid in South Africa followed the same pattern. The negotiations between the apartheid government and the African National Congress (ANC) were accompanied by considerable violence and unrest, including clashes between rival political groups, police crackdowns, and incidents like the Boipatong massacre and the assassination of Chris Hani, a prominent ANC leader. The first democratic elections, however, were marked by a high turnout. The government enacted decolonial policies such as Black Economic Empowerment and land reforms that stripped settlers of a number of their privileges, and settlers who chose to remain as citizens did so peacefully. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission also provided an interesting model, investigating past abuses and allowing perpetrators of human rights violations who provided full disclosure of their actions and demonstrated that their crimes were politically motivated (Truth) could apply for amnesty (Reconciliation), thus judging the colonial political program that had caused the crimes rather than the human tools it had used to do so.

Other cases of decolonization seem to follow the same pattern, showing that what we need to fear is not the dismantling of the colonial Israel state or the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state, but the unfolding of the transitionary period between them. This danger can be brought to a minimum, or even averted by learning from and improving on the South Africa and Kenya models, when the Palestinian liberation movement and their Israeli partners for decolonization and peace work together on it. The colonized have made it clear, decade after decade, that a democratic state is what we want to see from the river to the sea. They must work to make this vision even clearer to both friend and foe. We invite our other—today's colonizers—to "upgrade from settlers to citizens", as our Israeli comrade Ner Kitri beautifully expressed, and to join us in our common fight for freedom for all.

"[We were led] to believe we could not live without the nation-state, lest we not only be denied its privileges but also find ourselves dispossessed in the way of the permanent minority. The nation made the immigrant a settler and the settler a perpetrator. The nation made the local a native and the native a perpetrator, too. In this new history, everyone is colonized—settler and native, perpetrator and victim, majority and minority. Once we learn this history, we might prefer to be survivors instead." — "Neither Settler Nor Native", Mahmood Mamdani

Alain Alameddine is a decolonial praxicist with a focus on Palestine and the Sham region and a coordinator at the One Democratic State Initiative. He is happy to be reached at alain.a@odsi.co.

Seth Morrison is an American, Jewish antizionist activist supporting pro-Palestine organizations including Jewish Voice for Peace. Organizational information for identification only. He writes in his personal capacity. [sethmorrison30@gmail.com](mailto:sethmorrison30@gmail.com)

I don't even know where to start, but I've been subjected to an ad while watching streaming that was the worst thing I've seen in a long while...

A woman removes a pie from an over and says "Eddie, the pie came out crunch crunch, like you like it" and then the somber music kicks in... 'Bring them home' plays, a song sung by 1000 Israelis as a plea for the hostage release, as the voice over begins to tell us about the 100 hostages in the fictional Hamas Terror Tunnels. It shows a table at Thanksgiving, Christmas and focused on the empty seats.

The ad ends with a title card to bring them home, and shown sponsorship from The State of Israel. No website with info. No requests for donations. Just a crawling sensation down my spine and a creepy "How do you do fellow kids?" vibe.

I need to know what was the point? From the ridiculous nonsense slang to the music that makes Sarah MacLaclan's ASPCA adverts seem jolly, who was it designed to appeal to, and what actions were they hoping to inspire?

If it wasn't aired every time I started something, I would have not thought twice about it, but I'm seeing it so often, I needed to vent about it somewhere.

I live in a very rural area, and there are only two jewish families that I know of within driving distance- both of which are pretty zionist. However, i would love to discuss Torah, Jewish philosophy/theology and politics with people on a more personal level (for example, a group to talk about each week's Parsha). Does anyone know of any Discord groups (or other social media) that are like this?

It is not easy for Palestinians and allies who espouse Palestinian liberation to navigate dealing with Jewish Israelis. On one hand, they are occupying Palestinian land in several ways: First, most of them are geographically living in the territory of Palestine, some literally in robbed Palestinian homes. Second, they are benefiting from colonial privileges at the expense of all Palestinians inside and outside Palestine. Third, their collective existence as Israeli citizens is what makes the continued existence of the settler state possible. And fourth, the overwhelming majority of them support the continued existence of the settler state rather than decolonization and the transition to a democratic state.

On the other hand, around 80% of Israelis were born in Palestine. This means that, unlike those who actively chose to settle Palestine, millions of Jewish Israelis share this with Palestinians that they were born with a choice imposed on them. Of course, as they grow into adulthood and political understanding, they can make a different choice. Some have chosen to leave Palestine or even to give up Israeli citizenship. More importantly, others have chosen to side with the Palestinian right to their own state on all of their land.

It is easy to deal with Israelis who have taken such radical, clearcut decisions. But what about those who express a certain extent of support of Palestinian rights, perhaps in terms of equal rights or ending apartheid, but who still support the existence of the settler state? Haggai Matar's article on +972 Magazine, "Grappling with Jewish fears in a just Palestinian struggle", is an interesting case of such limited support.

Understanding "less than anti-Zionist" stances

In his article, Haggai recognizes "Zionism’s settler-colonial nature". He affirms his support for "Palestinian liberation and the end of Israel’s apartheid regime". What exactly does this entail? In his words, "we must not think that righting that wrong can be achieved by wronging Jews once again. The answer has to be decolonizing this land with all its inhabitants having the right to stay here along with returning Palestinian refugees — as two nations with equal individual and collective rights". There are, of course, many positive points there. At the same time, there are at least three pitfalls.

First, considering that Jews are "a nation with collective rights". Jews, like any other religious or other identity, have the right to feel they form a nation with those who share their identity. Muslims also speak of belonging to one Ummah or nation. This, however does not grant any of these "collective rights". For example, non-Saudi Muslims are entitled to view Mecca as holy. But this does not grant them the political right to enter it without proper authorization by Saudi authorities. Muslims do not have a collective national right to Islamic holy lands. Politicizing Jewish identity, i.e. granting political rights on the basis of one's being Jewish, is the core component of the Zionist settler colonial project.

Second, lumping all Jewish inhabitants of the land —again, ostensibly, on the basis of their identity— as a single group with similar rights, including the right to remain there. Depoliticize identity, however, and this makes little sense. Why would someone born in a land have the same right to remain there as someone who migrated last week? Why would someone who wishes to integrate a society have the same right to remain there as someone who wishes to ethnically raze it? Just because these four individuals are of the same religion or culture? It is the state of Israel that grants citizenship to any Jew of the world as a central pillar of its settler colonial nature. Recognizing this nature as Haggai does is not enough. Israelis must break free from it. This does not mean that Jews must leave. The Palestinian liberation movement has consistently voiced, over the decades, that there is absolutely no issue with Jews remaining as equals in Palestine. But this is on the basis of their being human and of their citizenship in the decolonized state, not on the basis of their identity — neither Jews, nor Muslims, nor any other identity have any collective political rights to/in Palestine.

Third, limiting the required change to "ending Israel's apartheid régime". A political régime is defined as a system, method or form of government. The problem with Israel is not its current form of government, it is its whole existence as a settler colonial state. This includes its two basic foundations which are the core of settler colonialism, and which are not covered by most understandings of the term "apartheid": Bringing settlers in (Israel's "Law of Return" and "Citizenship Law") and getting or keeping indigenous out (economic, legal and military ethnic razing, in additional to the denial of the right of return, since 1948). It also includes a third foundation which is the politicization of identity within the existing population. Ending these three pillars would not merely end the current form of government. It would end Israel as we know it, i.e. as a settler state. This means that, unlike Haggai's claim, "two states" —a euphemism for "the continued existence of the settler state"— cannot be a solution for real peace.

This failure to break with Zionism leads to other fallacies. For example, Haggai mentions that Hezbollah attacks from the north killed 48 civilians. He fails to mention that this happened over 13 months, that Israel killed over 3500 Lebanese in the same period and that most of these 48 civilians died following an Israeli massacre of around 500 Lebanese in a single day. Similarly, he speaks of Hezbollah displacing tens of thousands of Israelis while failing to mention Israel displaced over 1.5 million Lebanese — and fails to mention Hezbollah said they could return as soon as the genocide is over, whereas Israeli officials were explicit about their plans to occupy, settle and annex South Lebanon. His narration also fails to mention near-daily Israeli aggressions over Lebanese sovereignty prior to October 7 and the fact that it was Israel that broke the April Understanding that protected both Lebanese and Israeli lives.

The core issue: A settler state or a Palestinian state?

The above helps Palestinians as well as Israeli allies understand how failing to break with Zionism's settler colonial foundations leads to faulty reasonings and rhetoric. However, it still doesn't answer the basic question: How should Palestinians navigate dealing with "less than anti-Zionist" support?

Although "we should not engage with them as part of a solid stance of anti-normalization" is a perfectly understandable reaction, Haggai's admonition —actually the main point of his article— fully stands: "Nothing should prevent us from reimagining a Jewish existence in this land, or taking seriously the fears that are weaponized to justify Palestinian subjugation". This reimagining, however, must be based on the right of Palestinians to live as equals in a democratic state over all of their land. And it must be recognized that the fears of Israelis can only be truly calmed in the context of such a democratic state. 

It follows that the first step should be for all —Palestinians and Israeli allies— to refine their understanding of what decolonization means: The complete dismantling of all colonial relations of power imposed in/on Palestine, namely the three foundations mentioned above — Bringing settlers in, getting and keeping indigenous out and granting or denying rights on the basis of identity. In other words, a transition from the settler state that defines itself as "exclusive to the Jewish people" to a democratic Palestinian state for all its citizens.

The second step would be to offer help to sincere Israelis to progress toward this objective. This means that Israelis should be sincerely willing to consider an actual rupture with Zionism, and that Palestinians should be willing to help such individuals progress toward this—including efforts to recognize and alleviate their legitimate fears.

And this effort should not be merely individual. The Palestinian liberation movement has historically supported the establishment of one democratic state that welcomes Jews willing to remain as equal citizens. Although the Oslo accords threw confusion among Palestinian ranks, this view has been recently reiterated by leaders of the Palestinian resistance. However, it must be made clearer and more prominent in the Palestinian liberation discourse, a change that requires concerted work. This will give Israelis what Zionism has deprived them of: a choice. A choice that a growing number of Israelis are starting to make. Finally, this will succeed at redrawing the lines of this struggle from identitarian "Palestinians against Jews" to political "colonization vs decolonization".

Alain Alameddine is a decolonial praxicist with a focus on Palestine and the Sham region and a coordinator at the One Democratic State Initiative. He is happy to be reached at alain.a@odsi.co.